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Policies and regulations governing electromagnetic spectrum prioritize reducing conflict among active users of spectrum (transmitters), thereby enabling these active users to capture the values associated with property rights to spectrum. Coexistence of heterogeneous technologies and their enforcement have been well studied, but much less has been done to consider the coexistence of heterogeneous uses and the institutions that are necessary to address conflict arising among different users of spectrum.We argue that prevailing property-rights institutions that focus on reducing conflict among active users of spectrum generate a property mismatch that contributes to conflict with passive users of spectrum. Passive users are interested primarily in receiving signals transmitted by nature. The property-mismatch approach offers insight into how to redesign spectrum governance to balance the demands of both active and passive users. Particularly we argue that virtual parceling of the electromagnetic spectrum along a broader range of dimensions can better facilitate efficient spectrum sharing between active and passive users. 

Traditionally, spectrum allocation has been governed by centralized schemes (e.g., command-and-control). Nonetheless, other mechanisms, such as collaborative enforcement, have proven to be successful in a variety of scenarios. In Collaborative enforcement (i.e., collective action), the stakeholders agree on decision-making arrangements (i.e., access, allocation, and control of the resources) while being involved in monitoring the adherence to the rules as a shared effort. Blockchain is a distributed ledger of records/transactions (i.e., database) that brings many benefits such as decentralization, transparency, immutability, etc. One of the most notable characteristics of blockchain-based platforms is their definition as trust-less environments, as there is no central entity in charge of controlling the network interactions. Instead, trust is a group effort, achieved through repeated interactions, consensus algorithms, and cryptographic tools; therefore, converting blockchain systems into examples of collaborative governance regimes. In this paper, our goal is to analyze a particular application of blockchain and smart contracts for the 1695-1710MHz sharing scenario. In this way, we provide a theoretical analysis of the feasibility and the required characteristics to implement such a system. In addition, through the implementation of a Proof of Concept, we explore how the implementation of a blockchainbased organization can be the motor to build a collaborative governance scheme in the spectrum sharing arrangement of the 1695-1710MHz band 

To address the scarcity of spectrum, FCC mandated the dynamic sharing of spectrum among the different tiers of users. The success of spectrum sharing, however, relies on the automated enforcement of spectrum policies. We focus on ex post spectrum enforcement during/after the occurrence of a potentially harmful event, but before/after an actual harm has occurred. The major challenges addressed by us are to ensure maximum channel coverage in a given region of enforcement, accurate and reliable detection of enforcement, and selection of an efficient algorithm to select entities for detection of violation. We adopt a crowdsourced methodology to monitor spectrum usage. We ensure maximum coverage of the given area by dividing it into equal-sized regions and solve the enforcement problem by a divide and conquer mechanism over the entire region. We use a variant of the Multiple Choice Secretary algorithm to select volunteers. We finally simulate the enforcement framework and analyze the results. 

As radio spectrum sharing matures, one of the main challenges becomes finding adequate governance systems and the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. Historically, these processes were assigned to a central entity (in most cases a governmental agency). Nevertheless, the literature of Common Pool Resources (CPRs) shows that other governance mechanisms are possible, which include collaboration with a private, thirdparty regulator or the complete absence of central institutions, as in self-enforcement solutions. These alternatives have been developed around well-known CPRs such as fisheries, forests, etc. As argued by Weiss et al [50], and other researchers, spectrum can indeed be considered to be a CPR. In this work we study the two extremes of governance systems that could be applied to spectrum sharing scenarios. Initially, we study the classical centralized scheme of command and control, where governmental institutions are in charge of rule-definition and enforcement. Subsequently, we explore a government-less environment, i.e., a distributed enforcement approach. In this anarchy situation (i.e., lack of a formal government intervention as defined by Leeson [29]), rules and enforcement mechanisms are solely the product of repeated interactions among the intervening agents. For our analysis, we have selected the spectrum sharing framework of the 1695-1710MHz band. We also use the definitions presented by Bhattarai et al. [9], [10] as well as Altamimi [3] for managing the size of the coordination and exclusion zones. In addition, we utilize Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) to analyze the applicability of these governance mechanisms. ABM simulation allows us to explore how macro phenomena can emerge from micro-level interactions of independent agents.